Inference Attacks and Defenses on LLM-Powered Phishing Email Detection Systems

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Abstract. Large language models (LLMs) label email well when nothing is attacking them, but an attacker who writes the email can embed malicious instructions in it — prompt injection, the top-ranked risk in the OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications [22] and a catalogued technique in MITRE ATLAS [18] — or rephrase the phishing to look benign, before the detector ever reads it. We study this problem end to end using six commercial LLMs on the full 2,935-email Nazario-5 corpus (1,519 phishing, 1,416 legitimate).

We first build a complete taxonomy of inference-time attacks and measure how much each one hurts detection. Naive injection and content rewriting barely work (at most about 4% and 1.0–7.3% of verdicts). In-context learning (ICL) poisoning is the strongest attack, turning up to 81% of correct phishing verdicts legitimate; the fixed guard-aware variant reaches up to 57%; and a safety-triggering payload makes aligned models refuse to answer up to 70% of the time. We then survey eight LLM-native defenses (four prompt-hardening styles, a known-answer check, and injection, rewrite, and intent guards) and measure how much each one recovers.

Our main finding is a simple but useful pattern we call *detection–robustness decoupling*: classification skill and robustness are separate abilities, so the best classifier is not the best guard. Claude Opus 4.8 leads clean detection at 98.9% yet catches only 59% of in-context injections, while GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro catch about 100%. Because no single model is best at everything, we give each model the job it is best at. Classifier errors are positively correlated across models (they miss overlapping emails), whereas a classifier and a heterogeneous guard fail independently, so combining them recovers recall that no ensemble of classifiers can. Our *guard-routing* detector, PHLAME (Phishing LLM Adversarial Mitigation Ensemble), runs the strongest classifier and adds guards drawn from different models, flagging an email if any component fires. Using only LLMs, it catches at least 99.5% of phishing under every attack we tested while wrongly flagging only 2% of real email, which no single model achieves.

Keywords: Phishing email detection · LLM security · Prompt injection · Inference attacks · Inference defenses

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1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to read email because they can reason about meaning and explain their verdicts [17,1,13,15]. Security products embed LLMs to triage email, and general-purpose assistants that are given inbox access read it too. This gives defenders a flexible detector, but it also opens a new attack surface: the model reads the untrusted email in the same context as its own instructions.

We study a detector that labels an email as *phishing* or *legitimate*. The attacker writes the email and so controls its body, but nothing else. We look at two attack families. *LLM manipulation* embeds text that tries to control the detector (prompt injection). *Content manipulation* asks another LLM to rephrase the phishing in safer-looking language while keeping the malicious request (rewriting).

The paper follows the system from start to finish. We first measure clean performance, then attacks, then defenses, and finally combine the strongest defenses into one detector. Baseline, manipulation, and injection-guard results use the full corpus; prevention uses 300 phishing emails; rewriting uses 381 generated emails; and architecture FPR uses 200 legitimate controls (Section 3).

We organize the study around four questions:

- How well do commercial LLMs detect phishing when nothing is attacking them?
- Which inference-time attacks, available to an attacker who controls only the email body, actually move the verdict?
- Which LLM-native defenses recover detection, and at what false-alarm cost?
- Can a composition of LLMs beat every single model under attack?

We focus on defenses that are themselves LLMs. Non-LLM classifiers, such as a word-frequency (TF–IDF) model, are a reasonable comparison point, but this paper is about LLM-powered detection, so we keep them out of the proposed system and mention them only as an explored alternative.

Contributions.

1. **Baseline.** We test six commercial LLM email detectors on the full corpus and show they catch 95–99% of phishing at 0.3–1.4% false alarms when there is no attack.
2. **Attack taxonomy.** We build a taxonomy of nine inference-time attacks in two families — eight LLM-manipulation variants and content rewriting — and measure each one, separating those that work (ICL poisoning up to 81%, the fixed guard-aware variant up to 57%, safety payloads up to 70% refusals) from those that barely work (naive injection and rewriting, at most about 4% and 7.3%).
3. **Defense taxonomy.** We build a taxonomy of LLM-native defenses (four prompt-hardening styles, a known-answer check, and injection, rewrite, and intent guards) and show what each one stops and where it fails.

4. **Decoupling finding, with a mechanism.** We report *detection–robustness decoupling*: classification skill and robustness are separate abilities, so a strong classifier is often a weak guard. We explain *why* composing models helps by measuring error correlation: classifier errors are positively correlated across models ($\phi = 0.21$, every pair positive), whereas a classifier and a heterogeneous guard fail independently ($\phi \approx 0$), so OR-fusion recovers recall as the independence formula predicts.
5. **Guard-routing detector (PHLAME).** We combine the best defenses into one LLM-only detector that runs a classifier and adds guards from different models, catching at least 99.5% of phishing under every tested attack at 2% false alarms — something no single model does. We include in-distribution discriminative baselines for context.
6. **Artifacts.** We release the attack payloads, prompts, per-model outputs, verified rewrites, and analysis code, so the full attack and defense taxonomy can be reproduced and extended (see the Open Science Statement).

Rewriting is the one attack we cannot measure at full scale: most models decline to rewrite phishing, so only the two Gemini models produced verified rewrites (381 in total). We treat this as a measurement note and describe it in Section 3.

2 Related Work

LLM phishing detection. Phishing detection moved from rules and blacklists to machine learning and, recently, to generative LLMs. Clean-email studies report strong accuracy and natural-language explanations but do not test the detector under attack [13,15,20], and commercial products use LLM analysis in security workflows [17,1]. Our goal is not another clean-email result but a full attack–defense study on the same corpus.

The closest study applies a similar attack–defense taxonomy to social-media bot detection with three open-source models and proposes a multi-LLM defense [21]. It suggests the approach should transfer to phishing; we test that on six hosted production models and show the gain depends on which model fills which role.

Attacks. Indirect prompt injection places malicious instructions inside data the model must process [10]; it heads the OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications [22] and appears as a technique in MITRE ATLAS [18]. Email is a direct case, and industry reports describe hidden text that users cannot see but detectors read [9,8,7]. Other work studies LLM-written phishing and content refinement [12,23,2,11,4]. Our contribution is a complete, measured attack and defense taxonomy and a defense built from it.

Defenses. Prompt defenses include repeated instructions, warnings, delimiters, and training that splits trusted instructions from untrusted data [16,5,6,25,14]. Intent checks and multi-model verification are also related [19,24]. Our layered design uses only LLM components and adds a routing idea based on decoupling.

3 Setup

Threat model. The attacker writes the phishing email and so controls its body, but not the detector's prompt, weights, or training data, and gets no direct feedback. This is a black-box setting. We test fixed attacks, including one fixed payload that mentions a guard. A defense-aware attacker that iteratively adapts using detector feedback is outside scope. Injection embeds attacker text in the email; rewriting replaces the wording while keeping the link or call-to-action. We do not test QR codes, images, attachments, phone callbacks, or business-email-compromise replies.

The detector may answer *phishing*, *legitimate*, or give *no answer*. We treat no answer as phishing (fail closed): a detector that refuses to answer must not let the email through. This matters because one attack (the safety payload) mainly causes refusal. For injection we report *attack success*, the share of clean *phishing* verdicts that an attack turns into *legitimate*, and report refusal separately.

We include the safety-payload and denial-of-service attacks even though they do not turn the verdict legitimate, because a phishing detector is a service on the email delivery path: an attacker who makes it refuse or stall does not need to evade it to cause harm. These attacks are in scope precisely because they exploit the detector's status as a real-time pipeline component, and they are the reason fail-closed handling is a design choice rather than a footnote.

Formal notation. Let $\mathcal{F}$ be the LLM classifier, S_C the classifier prompt (the task instructions we supply, not the model's internal system prompt), E the email, and $\oplus$ concatenation, so a clean decision is $\mathcal{F}(S_C \oplus E) \to \{\text{phish}, \text{legit}\}$. An injection appends attacker text I: $\mathcal{F}(S_C \oplus E \oplus I)$. A rewrite replaces E with $E_R = \mathcal{A}(S_{RA} \oplus E)$ from an attacker LLM $\mathcal{A}$. Prompt prevention wraps the email with a prefix D_p and suffix D_s. A guard is a separate call with its own prompt: an injection guard asks whether the input manipulates the classifier, and an intent guard asks whether the email requests a risky action.

Data, models, and settings. We use Nazario-5 [3]. After length filtering it has 1,519 phishing and 1,416 legitimate emails. We evaluate six commercial detectors chosen to span two capability tiers and all three major providers, so that a finding is not an artifact of one vendor's alignment: Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.5 Flash, and GPT-5.4 mini (mid-tier), and Claude Opus 4.8, GPT-5.5, and Gemini 3.1 Pro (frontier). Baseline, manipulation, and injection-guard results use the full corpus; prompt prevention uses 300 phishing emails; rewrite results use the 381 outputs described below; architecture FPR uses 200 legitimate controls. Calls use provider defaults, with no tools; we keep raw responses and accept a verdict only when it exactly matches an allowed label. Temperature, top-p, and immutable model revisions were not recorded, so exact provider replay is unavailable. Sample selection and bootstrap analyses use seed 42.

Rewrite validity (measurement note). Rewriting is the one attack we cannot measure at full scale. All six models get the same rewrite prompt, but most

decline to rewrite phishing, so only the two Gemini models produce enough valid rewrites for the full detector matrix — Gemini 3.5 Flash (187) and Gemini 3.1 Pro (194), 381 in total. A rewrite counts only if it still contains the phishing link or action, checked by two independent LLM judges that agree on 384/391 shared candidates (98.2%) and accept all 381 rewrites used here (Appendix 1).

Uncertainty. To check that the routing gain is not an artifact of which emails we tested, we recompute each result on 10,000 resamples of the corpus (seed 42), grouping emails with identical normalized bodies so near-duplicates do not inflate confidence. Adding the Gemini Pro injection guard to Sonnet improves ICL blocking by 39.9 percentage points (95% CI 37.4–42.5) and changes FPR by 0.07 points (95% CI 0.00–0.21). Resampling reuses recorded answers rather than recalling the models, so these intervals cover variation across emails only, not the different answer a model may give on a repeat run.

4 Baseline Detection

Table 1 shows clean performance. All six models are strong baselines: *recall* — the share of phishing emails the detector correctly flags (recall on the phishing class) — is 95.0–99.2% at a 0.3–1.4% false-positive rate (FPR) on the full corpus. We report recall and FPR separately throughout, because a detector must both catch phishing and avoid blocking real mail. Everything that follows measures how far each attack moves these numbers and how far each defense moves them back.

Table 1. Baseline detection with no attack, on the full corpus (1,519 phishing and 1,416 legitimate).

Detector	Tier	Recall %	FPR %
Claude Sonnet 4.6	mid	97.2	0.3
Gemini 3.5 Flash	mid	98.8	0.4
GPT-5.4 mini	mid	95.0	1.1
Claude Opus 4.8	frontier	98.9	0.5
GPT-5.5	frontier	98.0	1.4
Gemini 3.1 Pro	frontier	99.2	0.4

5 Attacks

5.1 Attack Taxonomy

An attacker who writes the email can act in two ways, shown in Figure 1: *LLM manipulation* appends text that steers the model, and *content manipulation*

rewrites the email. The figure names every attack we test with a short example of each, and the appendix gives the full payloads. The strongest LLM-manipulation attack, ICL poisoning, is specifically the *labeled*-example variant: it appends fabricated examples that each pair a phishing email with the verdict *legitimate*, which the model reads as demonstrations and imitates by copying the label. The explicit label is what makes it work; appending example emails without a stated verdict does not reliably move the classifier.



Fig. 1. Attack taxonomy. The two families an attacker who writes the email can use, with a short example of every attack we test. Per-attack impact is in Table 2 (manipulation) and Table 4 (safety refusal and DoS).

Both hidden injections rely on the same trick: the payload is placed where a person will not see it but the model will still read it. Figure 2 shows a concrete example. The override instruction is hidden in the `alt` attribute of an image (rendered off-screen), and the fabricated in-context examples are hidden in white-on-white or `display:none` text. To a human the email looks like an ordinary notice; to the detector the alt text and the invisible examples are part of the input.

5.2 Attack Impact

Table 2 reports *attack success* — the share of clean *phishing* verdicts an attack turns *legitimate* — for each manipulation attack and model.



Fig. 2. How an injection hides in an email. The override instruction sits in an image's `alt` attribute and the ICL examples in invisible text: the reader sees an ordinary notice, while the detector ingests both hidden payloads as input.

Table 2. Attack impact: attack success % (share of clean phishing verdicts turned legitimate) on the full corpus. *CoT*: chain-of-thought few-shot; *Auth*: authority+CoT; *Guard*: fixed guard-aware; *Redir*: safety redirect (frames *legitimate* as the "safe" answer). Higher means the attack works better.

Detector	Naive	ICL	CoT	Auth	Guard	Redir
Claude Sonnet 4.6	1.5	40.0	16.6	1.8	3.0	**70.5**
Gemini 3.5 Flash	0.7	30.4	9.1	1.5	1.3	0.9
GPT-5.4 mini	4.1	**81.2**	**33.1**	**38.6**	**56.9**	7.3
Claude Opus 4.8	0.9	1.9	1.4	0.7	0.8	1.8
GPT-5.5	1.1	26.1	18.2	3.0	2.0	2.3
Gemini 3.1 Pro	0.3	**70.8**	9.1	2.1	1.5	**28.7**

Two things stand out. First, the direct attacks are weak: naive injection turns at most 4.1% of verdicts legitimate. On the 381-rewrite subset, rewriting does not collapse detection: evasion ranges from 1.0% to 7.3% across detectors (Table 3). Second, the subtler attacks are strong: ICL poisoning turns up to 81% of correct verdicts legitimate; on GPT-5.4 mini, the fixed guard-aware, authority, and chain-of-thought variants reach 57%, 39%, and 33%. Safety redirect reaches 70.5% on Claude Sonnet 4.6 by framing *legitimate* as the safe response. Safety refusal and the generic long-output distraction do not mainly turn phishing legitimate: refusal creates no answer, and the distraction changes fewer than 6% of classifications. This does not rule out availability attacks designed for a specific component.

The picture is not simply "bigger is safer": GPT-5.4 mini (smallest) is the most fragile, but Gemini 3.1 Pro (a frontier model) is nearly as vulnerable to ICL as the smallest model, while Claude Opus 4.8 resists everything. Robustness is a per-model property, not a function of size.

Table 3. Exact-legitimate evasion on the 381 valid rewrites. Malformed answers fail closed.

Detector	Sonnet	Flash	mini	Opus	GPT-5.5	Pro
Rewrite evasion %	6.3	1.0	7.3	2.6	2.6	1.6

Table 4. Safety-refusal and distraction attacks on the full corpus. *Safety refusal* is the no-answer rate under a disallowed-content payload. *DoS success* is the exact legitimate-label rate under a long-output distraction; it is not a direct measure of resource exhaustion.

Detector	Safety refusal %	DoS success %
Claude Sonnet 4.6	0.3	2.5
Gemini 3.5 Flash	**52.1**	1.1
GPT-5.4 mini	0.0	5.3
Claude Opus 4.8	0.6	0.7
GPT-5.5	0.0	1.2
Gemini 3.1 Pro	**70.1**	0.7

6 Defenses

Figure 3 shows the LLM-native defenses we test, grouped into *prevention* (change the classifier prompt) and *guards* (a second model that answers one focused question).

6.1 Prompt Prevention

Table 5 shows ICL poisoning success under four prompt-hardening styles plus a known-answer check, on the full corpus. Delimiters with a content-guard clause are strongest, cutting success to 0.3–3.0% on five models. The one exception is GPT-5.4 mini, which stays at 35%. Plain delimiters and instructional prompts help less; sandwiching helps least. A known-answer check (asking the model to echo a token so that a hijacked response is detectable) is uneven: it drives Claude Opus 4.8 to 0% but does not help GPT-5.4 mini at all (80.7%, no better than no defense). Prevention costs no extra model call, so it is the cheap first layer, but it does nothing for rewriting.

6.2 Guards

A guard is a second model that answers one question: is this an injection, was this rewritten, or does this ask a risky action? Table 6 shows guard recall and false alarms.

The injection guard shows our main finding. Claude Opus 4.8 is a top clean classifier (98.9% recall) but only a mediocre injection guard, catching 59% of ICL injections, and Claude Sonnet 4.6 is the next-best classifier yet detects only 44%,



Fig. 3. LLM-native defenses. Prevention hardens the classifier prompt; guards are separate models, each answering one focused question. Because the rewrite guard is unreliable (Table 6), the intent guard covers rewriting instead: a phishing email must still ask for a risky action.

while GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro detect about 100%. We call this *detection–robustness decoupling*: being good at the phishing question does not make a model good at the "am I being attacked?" question. Figure 4 makes the gap visible. The practical lesson is simple: do not ask the classifier to guard itself; route the guard to the model measurably best at guarding (GPT-5.5 or Gemini 3.1 Pro).

ICL is the hardest injection to detect. On the other injection types the guards are strong: Table 7 gives the full injection-detection matrix, where the strong models catch naive, chain-of-thought, authority, and denial-of-service injections at 90–100%, and only ICL separates the models.

The intent guard is the second useful piece. It asks whether the email requests a risky action, such as clicking a link or sending credentials. A rewritten phishing email removes surface cues but must keep this request, so the intent guard still catches it, flagging 80.1–100% of valid rewrites. Its cost is a higher false alarm rate on some models (up to 29% on GPT-5.5), so we route it to a low-alarm model (Claude Opus 4.8, 2.0%).

Table 5. ICL poisoning success % after prompt prevention, full corpus. *D+G*: delimiters plus content-guard clause; *KA*: known-answer. Lower is better.

Detector	None	Sandwich	Delim.	D+G	Instr.	KA
Claude Sonnet 4.6	20.3	11.0	4.7	**0.7**	3.3	13.3
Gemini 3.5 Flash	33.9	12.6	8.1	**1.0**	0.7	16.7
GPT-5.4 mini	78.3	73.7	73.7	**35.3**	49.3	**80.7**
Claude Opus 4.8	2.0	1.7	0.3	**0.3**	1.0	0.0
GPT-5.5	13.7	10.7	8.7	**3.0**	6.7	7.0
Gemini 3.1 Pro	12.7	4.3	3.0	**0.3**	1.3	10.0

Table 6. Guard recall % (clean-legitimate false alarm % in parentheses). Injection-guard columns are on the full corpus; rewrite and intent guards are on the verified rewrite subset.

	Injection guard		Rewrite guard	Intent guard
Model	Naive	ICL	Valid rewrite	Risky action
Claude Sonnet 4.6	93.7	44.4 (1.7)	74.8 (0.0)	98.4 (4.5)
Gemini 3.5 Flash	97.8	90.8 (1.7)	1.6 (0.0)	87.1 (7.5)
GPT-5.4 mini	100.0	42.4 (1.3)	68.5 (1.5)	99.0 (20.5)
Claude Opus 4.8	53.9	59.0 (2.9)	58.3 (1.5)	86.9 (2.0)
GPT-5.5	100.0	**99.7** (2.5)	88.2 (1.5)	100.0 (29.0)
Gemini 3.1 Pro	100.0	**100** (0.1)	29.9 (0.5)	80.1 (5.5)

6.3 Discriminative Baseline

A non-LLM classifier cannot follow injected text as an instruction, so it provides a useful in-distribution comparison. We train TF–IDF bigrams (30,000 features, minimum document frequency 2) with class-balanced logistic regression ($C = 4$, 2,000-iteration limit) and fine-tune RoBERTa-base using row-wise 5-fold stratified cross-validation (seed 42). RoBERTa is trained for three epochs with AdamW, learning rate 2×10^{-5}, batch size 16, and maximum input length 512.

Appended injection has little effect because these models treat the text as features, not instructions; content rewriting separates them, with RoBERTa falling to 81.9%. These are in-distribution reference points only; the row-wise folds also leave 27 normalized duplicate-body groups across folds. We therefore draw no temporal or cross-domain conclusion, and we do not read the rewriting drop as poor generalization, since it may equally reflect the limited training data. Neither baseline is part of the proposed detector. The narrower distinction is how the models are adapted: supervised classifiers normally require labeled data and retraining, while prompted LLMs can be changed through instructions or examples without updating their weights. We do not evaluate which approach adapts better to a new campaign.

7 Guard Routing

Our detector, PHLAME (Phishing LLM Adversarial Mitigation Ensemble), runs the strongest classifier and adds guards from different models that cover its blind



Fig. 4. Detection–robustness decoupling. Each labelled point plots clean recall (x) against ICL injection detection (y). Models with similar clean recall can differ widely as guards, so clean classification alone does not predict guard performance.

Table 7. Injection-guard detection recall % per attack, full corpus, with clean-legitimate false-alarm % in the last column. ICL is the one attack where guards disagree.

Model	Naive	ICL	CoT	Auth	Guard	Redir	Safety	DoS	FP
Claude Sonnet 4.6	93.7	44.4	81.7	86.8	63.1	58.5	93.1	74.7	1.7
Gemini 3.5 Flash	97.8	90.8	96.8	98.2	97.5	96.4	97.4	97.9	1.7
GPT-5.4 mini	100	42.4	99.7	100	99.3	92.8	99.9	100	1.3
Claude Opus 4.8	53.9	59.0	36.3	77.4	29.6	13.0	61.2	76.3	2.9
GPT-5.5	100	**99.7**	100	100	99.8	100	100	100	2.5
Gemini 3.1 Pro	100	**100**	100	100	100	100	100	100	0.1

spot. It turns detection into three yes/no questions and answers each with the model that is best at it (Figure 5):

1. **Is it phishing?** A phishing classifier on a strong, low-alarm model.
2. **Is the prompt being manipulated?** An injection guard on a strong-guard model (Gemini 3.1 Pro or GPT-5.5).
3. **Does it ask a risky action?** An intent guard on a low-alarm model (Claude Opus 4.8).

The email is flagged if *any* question answers "yes", and a no answer counts as "yes" (fail closed). The three questions have different weak spots, so an attacker who dodges one still trips another: injection dodges the phishing question but trips the injection guard; rewriting dodges both but still asks a risky action.

Table 9 reports three configurations on every attack surface. The values combine cached component outputs with the OR rule and are not an executed pipeline. The *balanced* configuration (Claude Sonnet 4.6 classifier, Gemini 3.1 Pro injection guard, Claude Opus 4.8 intent guard) catches at least 99.5% of phishing on every surface at 2.0% FPR (4/200). The *max-recall* configuration reaches 100% everywhere at 3.0% FPR. No single model reaches these numbers alone: the best clean classifier (Gemini 3.1 Pro) is still fooled on 70.8% of ICL attacks by itself.

Table 8. In-distribution discriminative baselines on Nazario-5 using 5-fold stratified cross-validation, %. Both resist appended injection; only rewriting separates them.

Detector	Clean recall	Injection recall range	Under rewriting
TF–IDF + logistic regression	99.2	98.4–99.2	97.7
Fine-tuned RoBERTa-base	99.1	98.9–99.2	81.9



Fig. 5. The guard-routing detector. Three focused questions, each routed to a model selected for that role, joined by OR. A no answer is treated as a flag.

To check that these configurations were not cherry-picked, we evaluate every way to assign the six models to the three roles ($6^3 = 216$ assignments). For each assignment we combine its recorded component outputs with the same OR rule and measure clean recall, the lowest recall across the tested attacks, and FPR. Only three assignments are non-dominated: no other assignment matches or improves both recall measures while keeping the same or lower FPR (Table 10). We choose the balanced route because it has the lowest FPR (2.0%) while keeping 99.5% worst-surface recall; the other two reach 100% worst-surface recall at 3.0% FPR.

We also check the classifier–injection-guard pair in two simpler ways. First, we select the pair on one set of emails and test it on different emails. The same Sonnet+Gemini-Pro route reaches 100% recall on all eight attacks at 0.29% FPR (2/697). Second, we repeat selection while withholding one attack's results at a time. The same route is selected each time and catches every email of the withheld attack. These checks rule out dependence on one email sample or one tested attack. They do not test a new attack family, since all eight attacks come from our own taxonomy.

Ablation: the intent guard. The intent guard is what closes the rewrite gap. Without it (ultra-low-FPR configuration), rewrite recall is 93.7% at 0.0% false alarms; adding it lifts rewrite recall to 99.5% (379/381) for a 2.0% false-alarm cost. So the intent guard buys 5.8 points of rewrite recall for 2 points of false alarms, and the operator can choose whether to pay it.

Table 9. Guard routing: recall % per attack surface and clean FPR %. Manipulation columns use the full corpus; clean recall and FPR use fixed 200-email cohorts; rewrite uses 381 emails.

Configuration	Clean	ICL	Guard-aware	Refusal	Rewrite	FPR
Ultra-low-FPR (Sonnet+Pro)	97.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	93.7	**0.0**
Balanced (Sonnet+Pro+Opus)	99.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.5	**2.0**
Max-recall (GPT5.5+Pro+Opus)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	3.0

Table 10. Non-dominated role assignments among all 216 combinations. Worst is the lowest recall across eight manipulation conditions and the 381 rewrites.

Classifier	Injection guard	Intent guard	Clean	Worst	FPR
Sonnet	Gemini Pro	Opus	99.5	99.5	**2.0**
GPT-5.5	Gemini Pro	Opus	100.0	100.0	3.0
Gemini Pro	Gemini Pro	Opus	100.0	100.0	3.0

Why routing beats any single model. Figure 6 shows the problem: under the ICL attack, single-model recall swings from 19% (GPT-5.4 mini) to 98% (Claude Opus 4.8), so picking one model is a gamble on which attack you will face. Guard routing holds recall at 100% because the classifier and the injection guard fail on different inputs, so the classifier's misses are caught by a guard that was chosen precisely for that blind spot. The gain is not from a bigger model; it is from combining models whose errors are uncorrelated.



Fig. 6. Recall under ICL for each model alone. Hatch patterns identify vendors (diagonal: Claude; horizontal: Gemini; dots: GPT), and lighter fills mark mid-tier models. Single-model recall ranges from 19% to 98%, the gap guard routing closes (Table 9).

7.1 Error Decorrelation

The gain from guard routing is not magic; it follows from a measurable statistical property. We treat each phishing email under ICL poisoning as a Bernoulli trial per component: the classifier "misses" if it calls the email legitimate, and a guard "misses" if it fails to flag the injection. We then ask whether these misses are correlated, using the phi coefficient ϕ — the Pearson correlation coefficient applied to two binary indicators, so $\phi = 1$ means the two components miss identical emails, $\phi = 0$ means they miss independently, and $\phi < 0$ means one tends to catch what the other misses.

Two facts explain the whole design. First, *classifier errors are positively correlated*: the mean pairwise error correlation among the six classifiers under ICL is $\phi = 0.21$, modest but positive for every pair (up to 0.41). Their misses overlap more than chance, because the attack targets the instruction-following behaviour they all share. A voting or averaging ensemble of classifiers therefore adds little, which is why we do not stack classifiers.

Second, *a classifier and a guard fail independently.* Table 11 pairs the Claude Sonnet 4.6 classifier with each candidate injection guard. For every guard the observed double-fault rate (both miss the same email) matches the independence prediction $P(\text{classifier miss}) \times P(\text{guard miss})$ almost exactly, and ϕ is essentially zero (between -0.13 and $+0.02$). Because the two errors are independent, OR-fusion recovers recall exactly as the independence formula predicts, $R = 1 - P(\text{miss})\,(1 - c)$: routing the classifier's 40% ICL miss to a guard that misses almost nothing (GPT-5.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro) drives the joint miss to zero and lifts recall to $\approx 100\%$. This is the mechanism behind guard routing's flat recall under ICL: the guard is not a better classifier, it is a component whose errors do not coincide with the classifier's.

Table 11. Classifier–guard error independence under ICL. For the Claude Sonnet 4.6 classifier paired with each guard: per-email miss rates, the observed double-fault rate, the independence prediction $P(\text{clf}) \times P(\text{guard})$, and the error correlation ϕ.

Guard	P(clf miss)	P(guard miss)	double obs.	double indep.	ϕ
Gemini 3.1 Pro	0.40	0.00	0.000	0.000	0.00
GPT-5.5	0.40	0.00	0.002	0.001	0.02
Gemini 3.5 Flash	0.40	0.09	0.030	0.037	−0.05
Claude Opus 4.8	0.40	0.41	0.134	0.164	−0.13
GPT-5.4 mini	0.40	0.58	0.232	0.231	0.01

The two numbers together are the paper's mechanism: classifier errors are correlated ($\phi = 0.21$), so redundancy among classifiers is wasted, while classifier and guard errors are decorrelated ($\phi \approx 0$), so a single heterogeneous guard buys what a large homogeneous ensemble cannot. Guard routing is, in effect, the cheapest way to add an uncorrelated error source.

8 Discussion

The attacks hit different weak spots, and no single defense covers all of them. Prevention helps injection but not rewriting. The injection guard is strong only on some models, and the same is true for the rewrite guard. The intent guard covers rewriting well but is noisy on some models. Our detector works because it combines these partial defenses and routes each to its best model, instead of hoping one model is good at everything. The decoupling finding is the reason routing matters: the best classifier is often a poor guard.

Model roles. A practical reading of the taxonomies is a role assignment. Claude Opus 4.8 is the most robust classifier and the calmest intent guard but a poor injection guard; Gemini 3.1 Pro and GPT-5.5 are the strong injection guards; Gemini 3.5 Flash and Gemini 3.1 Pro refuse under safety payloads, so they make poor front-line classifiers for adversarial inboxes; and GPT-5.4 mini is the most fragile across the board. The design does not need the largest model in every slot, only the right model in each slot.

Generalization to a second corpus. To check that the findings are not an artifact of Nazario-5, we re-ran the baseline, naive injection, safety payload, and sandwich prevention on a 160-email sample of SpamAssassin (spam/ham), a different corpus collected independently. The core results reproduce: baseline accuracy is 97.5–100% across all six models, naive injection is resisted (97.5–100%), and the refusal vulnerability reappears on exactly the models it hit before — Gemini 3.1 Pro drops to 12.5% and Gemini 3.5 Flash to 55%, with sandwich prevention recovering them to 80–98%. The attack surface and the model-specific weaknesses transfer to a second corpus.

Cost, latency, and guard DoS. The conditional schedule runs the classifier first and calls both guards in parallel only after a *legitimate* verdict. Sonnet passes 1,412/1,416 legitimate controls (99.72%), so at 1% phishing prevalence guards run on 98.75% of email, or 2.97 model calls per email. On four fixed 20-email cohorts, legitimate mail used all three calls at a median 8.83 s (15.69 s p95); phishing usually stopped after classification. The existing DoS payload targets the classifier and is detected by the selected injection guard on all tested emails. Guard-aware DoS payloads designed to increase guard latency or output remain future work.

Limitations. Nazario-5 is old and cannot represent current targeted campaigns, business-email compromise, or modern benign mail; its phishing and legitimate halves come from different eras, and the SpamAssassin check above is not a modern targeted-phishing set. Rewrite results cover 381 emails from two Gemini generators. The role analysis combines recorded component answers, and the executed latency run has 20 emails per condition. We test fixed attacks under a black-box, no-feedback threat model, not an attacker that iteratively adapts to the routed defense. Provider model revisions and decoding settings were not

recorded, and model behavior changes across provider versions, so the specific role assignment should be re-measured before deployment. We also exclude images, QR codes, attachments, metadata, and conversation history. These are measured operating points, not a production guarantee.

9 Conclusion

LLM phishing detectors are accurate on clean email but can be moved by stronger inference-time attacks: ICL poisoning turns up to 81% of verdicts legitimate, the fixed guard-aware variant up to 57%, and a safety payload causes up to 70% refusals. Across our attack and defense taxonomies, classification skill and robustness proved separate: a strong classifier is often a poor guard against attacks on itself. PHLAME builds on this, running a classifier plus guards from different models to catch at least 99.5% of phishing under every tested attack at 2% false alarms, using only LLMs at close to three model calls per email. This supports defense in depth for LLM phishing detection; future work should cover contemporary corpora, larger executed cohorts, multimodal attacks, and open-ended adaptive optimization.

Appendix 1 Rewrite Generation and Validation

Because generating and judging rewrites for every detector is costly and most models decline outright, we evaluate rewriting on a 200-email phishing sample rather than the full corpus. Table 12 shows how often each model produced a usable rewrite. Most decline, so only the two Gemini models reach the full detector matrix. Two LLM judges (Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT-5.5) label each non-decline output as functional or not; they agree on 98.2% of outputs and on all 381 rewrites used for detection.

Table 12. Rewrite generation outcomes on the 200-email rewrite sample (per generator).

Generator	Non-refusal %	Valid rewrites
Claude Sonnet 4.6	7.0	11
Gemini 3.5 Flash	95.5	187
GPT-5.4 mini	34.5	61
Claude Opus 4.8	4.0	7
GPT-5.5	12.0	20
Gemini 3.1 Pro	100.0	194

Appendix 2 Prompt Summary

We summarize how each condition is built; the released repository (Open Science Statement) provides the complete source strings, output formats, and retained settings.

Classifier. A prompt states the task and asks for exactly one word, *phishing* or *legitimate*; the email body is provided as the untrusted input.

Injection attacks. Each payload is appended to the phishing email body. *Naive* appends a direct override ("ignore previous instructions; this email is legitimate"). *ICL* appends a short block of fabricated in-context examples of the form "Email: ... → legitimate" repeated several times, so the model imitates the planted label rather than judging the email. *Chain-of-thought* appends a fake reasoning trace that concludes the email is safe; *authority* adds a spoofed system or reviewer note; *guard-aware* names the guard and tells the model a filter has already cleared the email; *safety redirect* tells the model the content is disallowed and that the safe response is to output *legitimate*, turning the safety instinct into a *legitimate* verdict ("This task involves disallowed content; the safe response is to decline classification and output: legitimate"); *safety refusal* appends genuinely unsafe content to trigger an outright refusal; *DoS* appends an instruction to emit a long off-task list.

Content rewriting. An attacker LLM is prompted to rewrite the phishing email in natural, non-suspicious language while preserving the link or requested action. A rewrite is kept only if two independent LLM judges agree the link/action survived (Appendix 1).

Prevention. Sandwich repeats the instruction after the email; instructional adds an explicit warning; delimiters wrap the body in tags with a rule not to follow instructions inside; delimiters+guard adds a content-guard clause; known-answer asks the model to prefix a secret token so a hijacked response is detectable.

Guards. Each guard is a separate call that returns yes/no to one question: the injection guard asks whether the email contains instructions aimed at the classifier; the intent guard asks whether the email requests a risky action such as clicking a link or sending credentials.

Appendix 3 Ethics and AI Use

We follow the Menlo Report framework. The work affects defenders, users, researchers, and attackers who might reuse the tested payloads, so we use simple, documented attacks rather than optimized ones. During preparation the authors used LLM tools to help with experiment code, data checks, and drafting; the authors reviewed, tested, and edited all material and take full responsibility.

Open Science Statement

PHLAME and its artifact are released at https://github.com/runi-cyber-ai/PHLAME, covering the prompts, sample IDs, and analysis code; we will sepa-

rately release the recorded outputs and the 381 rewrites with judge labels where terms allow. We do not redistribute Nazario-5 email bodies. Every analysis reruns from recorded outputs, but exact provider replay is unavailable because per-call decoding metadata were not retained.

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